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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah

JOHNSON READY-MIX CONCRETE
COMPANY, a corp·oration,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

-vs.-

No. 9247

U N I T E D PACIFIC INSURANCE
COMPANY, a corporation,
Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF FACTS
This is an action upon an insurance policy brought
by Johnson Ready-Mix Concrete Company, Plaintiff and
Respondent, herein referred to as Johnson Ready-Mix,
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against United Pacific Insurance Company, Defendant
and Appellant, herein referred to as United Pacific. Trial
was held in the District Court of Cache County, Utah,
before a jury on March 7 and 8, 1960, the Honorable
Lewis Jones, District Judge, presiding, and resulted in a
verdict in favor of Johnson Ready-Mix for $12,250.00
(R. 160). Prior to entry of judgment on the verdict,
United Pacific moved the entry of judgment in accordance with its Motion for Directed Verdict or, in the alternative, for a ne\v trial (R. 323). This appeal followed
denial of these motions and entry of Judgment on Verdict
on ~{arch 14, 1960 (R. 161, 172).
United Pacific is an insurance company organized
under the laws of the State of vVashington on ~farch 20,
1928, and duly qualified to do business as an insurer
within the State of Utah since ~farch 30, 1933. Johnson
Ready-Mix is a Utah corporation engaged in the manufacture, distribution and sale of mixed concrete primarily
in the area of Cache County, Utah. On ~fay 12, 1954, the
President of Johnson Ready-l\Iix 'vas LeGrand Johnson.
Percey Quinney was Sec~etary and Treasurer and Office
Manager (R. 214). Mr. Quinney had si1nilar positions
\Vith four other corporations principally o'vned by :r..Ir.
Johnson (R. 222).
On

~1ay

12, 1954, there ,yas in full force and effect a

co1nprehensive bodily injury and property dan1age liability poljry issued by United Pacific to J-ohnson Ready-
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~iix

covering, among other things, the liability of John-

son Ready-Mix to persons injured as a result of the use
of motor vehicles by employees of Johnson Ready-Mix
Company (Ex. 1). On that date one of the employees of
Johnson Ready-1\iix, while making a delivery of concrete,
'vas involved in an accident in which Christian F. Blazer
received personal injuries ultimately requiring an operation (R. 249, 256). The driver of the truck John Olsen,
was aware of this accident (R. 261, 262). Mr. Blazer reporte·d the accident to Devere Taggart, a supervisory
employee of Johnson Ready-Mix, who then interviewed
Mr. Olsen briefly concerning it (R. 221, 270, 271). According to both Mr. Taggart and Mr. Quinney the accicident was not brought to Mr. Quinney's attention (R.
219, 220, 272) although he had the responsibility for
reporting accidents to the agent of United Pacific.
The procedure of Johnson Ready-l\iix relative to the
reporting of accidents was detailed by Mr. Quinney. He
testified:
"Q. Did you, Mr. Quinney, have anything to
do as a part of your duties as. office manager,
anything to do with the instructions given employees as to the reporting of accidents 1
A.

Yes, I instructed them.
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Q. And did you instruct specifically Mr.
Taggart as to what he was to do with regard to
accidents th~t came to his attention~

A. Yes.
him~

Q.

And what instructions did you give

A.

That they should be reported to the of-

Q.

And I take it that would be to you~

fice.

A. Yes.
Q. As office manager f

A. Yes.
Q. Did you give any instructions to 1\fr. John
Olsen the truck driver~

A.

I don't recall.

Q. Did you give any general instructions to
truck drivers f

A.

No, not directly.

Q. Did you give any instructions to Mr.
Taggart with respect to telling the drivers what
the pTocedure was in connection with reporting
accidents f
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that

A.

Yes.

Q.

And what did you tell Mr. Taggart in

regard~

A.

That if we had an accident, to report it.

Q. In other words, the truck drivers were to
report any accidents of which they knew to who, to
you or to ~1r. Taggart~

A. vV ell, to either one as long as it got to
the office.
Q. I see. So they could have reported then
to you or to Mr. Taggart, and he in turn, under
the procedure, would have reported it to you 1

A. Yes.
Q. And was that procedure in effect prior to
May of 19541

A. Yes.
Q. And was in effect during the month of
May of that year.
A.

Yes." (R. 224, 2.25).

The general duties of Mr. Taggart were described •
by ~Ir. Quinney as follows:
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"Q. And did the corporation, on May twelfth
of 1954, also employ a man by the name of Devere
Taggart~

A.

Yes.

Q.

And what was his job?

A. He was batch plant operator, and he
overseen the operations, drivers' delivery of the
concrete to the layers.
Q. Did he sort of oversee the ready-nrix concrete end of the business~

A. Yes.
:!&:

*

:)!:

* *

*

"Q. Now were there other businesses being
conducted by corporations in which ~1:r. LeGrand
Johnson had an interest at that time~
A. Yes.
Q. And just generally what other businesses
were being conducted~

A. Well, there was the LeGrand Johnson
Enterprises; that was a holding co1npany; and
L~eGrand Johnson Corporation \Vas a nrining and
quarrymg-

*

•

the other one
Company.

\Yas

*

*

*

* *

~

LeGrand Johnson ·Construction
*

*

*

*

*
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"Q. Now were there other men in addition
to Mr. Taggart that had the same type of job that
he did with Johnson Ready ~fix Concrete Company!
A.

Not the same type of job, no.

Q.

Was he the only supervisor1

A. Yes.
Q. And did these truck drivers, four or five,
work under him'
A.

Yes." (R. 221-3)

The policy provided with respect to notice of accidents:
"When an accident or an occurence takes
place, written notice shall be given by or on behalf
of the insured to the company or any of its authorized agents as soon as practicable. Such notice
shall contain particulars sufficient to identify the
insured and also reasonably obtainable informaton
respecting the time, place and circumstances of the
accident or occurence, the names and addresses
of the injured and of available witnesses, and information respecting applicable insurance available to the insured at the time of the accident or
occurrence. If claim is made or suit is brought
against the insured, the insured shall immediately
forward to the company every demand, notice,
sum1nons or other process received by him or his
representative." (Ex. 1).
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Johnson Ready-Mix admits that no notice of this
accident was given United Pacific until after Johnson
Ready-Mix Concrete Company receiv·ed a demand letter
from counsel for Mr. Blazer on May 14, 1957, more than
three years after the accident occurred (R. 196, 220, Ex.
11).
At the. trial of this case the ·Court submitted as issues
of fact for determination by the jury whether Johnson
Ready-Mix knew of the occurence of the accident and
whether, if Johnson Ready-Mix knew of the accident, it
reasonably appeared too trivial to require reporting to
United Pacific (Instruction No. 2, R. 148).
By its verdict the jury found either that Johnson
Ready-Mix had no knowledge of the accident or that it
appeared so trivial as to not require that notice of it he
given United Pacific.
STA·TE~1:ENT

OF POINTS

POINT I
THE. COURT ERRED IN SUBMITTING TO 'THE JURY
THE QUESTION OF WHETHER JO·HNSON READY-MIX
HAD

NOTI~CE

OF THE ACCIDENT.
POINT II

THE COURT ERRED IN ITS INSTRUCTION NO. 9.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT ERRED IN SUBMITTING TO ITHE JURY
THE QUESTION OF WHETHER JOHNSON READY-MIX
HAD

NOTI~CE

OF THE ACCIDENT.

There was no question concerning the fact that
notice of the accident was not given to United Pacific
until1nore than three years after the accident had occurred. It was the position of Johnson Ready-Mix that Mr.
Taggart's knowledge of the accident was not imputable
to it as he was a mere batch plant operator with authority
only to mix cement, receive orders for cement and dis-patch haulers to customers (R. 129).
It was the position of United Pacific that notice to
the company was shown as a matter of law and that the
only issue for the jury was whether the accident reasonably appeared so trivial as to not require that notice of
it be given to United Pacific (R. 298, 301, 308).
Since the Court submitted the question of the knowledge of Johnson Ready-Mix of the accident and since
the jury could have found that no such knowledge existed
and thus sustain its verdict, if it was error to submit
that issue, then this case must be reversed and remanded
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to the District Court of Cache County for a new trial.
Olsen, et al., v. W arwood, et al., 123 Utah 111, 255 P.
2d 725 (1953).
The evidence was without conflict that Mr. Taggart
had authority to receive notice of accidents involving
Ready-Mix truck drivers from such truck drivers and
relay such notice to Mr. Quinney. There also \Vas no
conflict in the evidence that Ready-Mix truck drivers
were instructed to report accidents to either Mr. Taggart
or ~{r. Quinney (R. 2.24, 225).

It is well settled that where a driver notifies one
whose duty it is to receive reports of accidents and transmit them to a supervisor, it constitutes notice to the
insured, although such knowledge is not properly transmitted. 8 Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice, 137
(Duties of Insured, Notice of Accidents, Claim or Suit,
Section 4742).
The leading A1nerican decision upon this question
is Woolverton v. FideliJty and Casualty Company of
New York, (N.Y., 1907) 82 N. E. 745. In that case it was
held that an insured is not excused from giving notice
of an accident merely because none of its general officers
or dire.ctors or anyone who had the duty of adjusting
differences between it and the insurer had lmo"Tledge
thereof, and that, while the lmo,Yledge of the driver
who caused the accident is not imputable to the insured,
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yet, if he reported it to one whose duty it was in the
ordinary and natural conduct of the business to receive
reports of accidents and trans1nit them to the general
superintendent, and he failed to transmit such knowledge,
the insured is chargeable for his delay and neglect.

In Iloffman v. Employers Liability Assur. Corp.,
Ltd., (Ore., 1934) 29 P. 2d 557, an accident occurred at
The Dalles, Oregon while Plaintiff was engaged in constructing a theatre building and laying a cement sidewalk
in front of it. Donaca was Plaintiff's foreman at the
time of the accident. He had been instructed to report
all accidents to Plaintiff or to Plaintiff's general superintendent immediately upon their occurrence but failed
to do so and this accident was not report~e·d to the insurer
until one year later.
Plaintiff sought to excuse his late notice upon the
ground that he had no personal knowledge of the accident
and asserted that he was not chargeable with the kno\vledge of the accident that Donaca had acquired at the
time of its occurrence and failed to report. Quoting the
\\T oolverton decision, the court said:
"Where, however a master employs many
servants and the duty of acquiring information
of the accidents as they occurred is necessarily
committed to servants or agents, if the acquisition of such information is an affirmative duty
on his part., we cannot see why he is not responSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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sible for the negligence or fault of the servants to
whom he entrusts the duty to the same extent as
he would be responsible for their negligence or
misconduct ,,in any other obligation to third
persons ...
"While we thus hold that the Plaintiff was
chargeable for the delay and neglect of its agents
or servants in failing to apprise it of an accident,
the occurrence of which they had acquired knowledge or information, this principal must be confined to those agents whose duty it was, either by
express regulation of the Plaintiff or by their
supervision and control in the natural and proper
conduct of business over the subordinate servants
by whom the accident had been caused, to transmit such knowledge
to their superiors or the
,,
company ....
The Oregon court then said :
"In the case at bar the evidence shows that
Plaintiff was actively engaged, as a contractor,
in constructing numerous buildings in different
cities and transacted his business under the supervision of a general superintendent. That neither
Plaintiff nor said superintendent was at The
Dalles where this particular 'vork "'as being
carried on. Donaca had been sent to The Dalles
to take charge of and supervise the work of completing the building and side,valk, and he had
been instructed to report all accidents covered
by the policy either to Plaintiff or to the general
superintendent. In the perforn1ance of the ,york
he was not a mere servant but tihe man. in charge
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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who stood in the shoes of and represented the
master. ~F'or Donaca's conduct while acting within
the scope of his e·mployment and for his failure
to perform his duties while so acting, Plaintiff
was responsible to third parties so far as their
rights were affected thereby, and as much chargeable with the knowledge Donaca had of the happ·ening of the accident as he would have been
had he been personally present and poss.essed all
of the knowledge that Donaca had at the time."
A similar result was. reached in Black and Whvte
Cab Cornpany v. New York Indemn~ty Co., (W.Va., 1929)
150 S. E. 521, where it was held that the insurer was
relieved fron1 liability for an accident which the cab
company had failed to report, and that lack of knowledge
of the accident on the part of tfue managing officers
of the cab co·mpany did not excuse its failure since the
driver of the cab involved in the accident had been
instructed by his employer to report .accidents and thereby became the company's agent to receive the information.
This rule is not, of cours.e, peculiar to knowledge
of accidents or to insurance policies.
"The law imputes to the princip·al, and
charges him with, all notice or lmowledge relating
to the s.ubject-matter of the agency which the
agent acquires or obtains while acting as such
agent and would in the scope of his authority, or,
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according to the weight of authority, which he
may previously have acquired and which he then
had in mind, or which he had acquired so recently
as to reasonably warrant the assumption that he
still retained it. Provided, however, that such
notice or knowledge will not be imputed: (1)
where it is such as it is the agent's duty not to
disclose: ( 2) where the agents relations to the
subject-matter are so adverse as to practically
destroy the relation of agency; and ( 3) where the
person claiming the benefit of the notice, or those
whom he represents, colluded with the agent to
cheat or defraud the principal.
"This rule does not depend, in either case,
upon the fact that the agent has disclosed the
knowledge or information to his principal; subject
to the exceptions named, the la'v conclusively presumes that he has done so, and charges the principal accordingly." Latses v. Nick Floor, Inc., 99
Utah 214, 104 P. 2d 619 (1940), citing 2 :h!echam
on Agency ( 2d Ed.) 1397 (Sec. 1813) .
Because there was no issue of fact for the jury as
to the knowledge of Johnson Ready-1\fix of the accident,
the trial court committed prejudicial error in instructing
the jury that:
"The final issues of fact for you to determine
in this case become:
1. Was any notice of the accident ever received by the Plaintiff corporation prior to May
1957?
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2. Did the accident appear so trivial or
1ninor (even though Plaintiff found out about it
within a few days, should you so find) as to not
require that notice of it be given to Defendant~"
(Instruction No.2, R. 148).
POIN'T II
TH·E COURT ERRED IN ITS INSTRUCTION NO. 9.

In its Instruction No. 9 the Court charged :
"Ordinarily, knowledge of an accident to a
tea1nster is not imputed to his employer. The
duty of the employer is to exercise ordinary diligence in adopting such measures as would lead
to knowledge on his part of the occurrence of
the accident and if you believe in this case that
the Plaintiff company did use reasonable care
to learn of the accide!nt then the mere fact that
the teamster or truck driver or other employee
not authorized to act for the company had knowledge of the accident which was not transmitted
to a proper officer would not constitute knowledge to the Plaintiff.
The Plaintiff's theory of this case is that
no proper officer or agent of the Plaintiff had
any notice of the accident whatever until a letter
from the attorney was received ap·proximately
three years after the accident. And in this connection they contend that notice to the witness
Olsen and notice to the witness Taggart was
not notice to the comp·any.
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In- this. connection, you are instructed that
a, corp-oration. can only .receive notice through its
officers and ~gents and there is a difference between a.mere employee and a supervising .agent or
officer of the company.
If the jury·.believes. that the witness Taggart
was a supervising agent or a person authorized
to accept notice for and on behalf .of the Plaintiff,
then whatever notice Taggart had of the accident
is notice to the Plaintiff.

):

...

If, on the other hand, you find that Taggart
was a mere batch piant op·erator with authority
to ~ the cement, receive orders for cement and
dispatch the haulers to the respect~ve customers
w1th ··no: supervisory or oUher such authority or
·power 'in the conduct of the business of the corporatio·n, then notice to Taggart would not be
notice to the Plaintiff.
You are further charged that the witness
Quinney was at all times an officer of the cor:.poration, and : any notice which you may find
he received concer~ing the accident became notice
to the corporation." (R. 155).

This Instruction, requested by J olmson Ready-Mix
(R. 12.9), is ~ot sup·ported by the evidence and, indeed,
is ~qntr:ary to tihe undisputed testimony of the SecretaryTreas.ure·r. and Office Manager of J olmson Ready-l\{ix,
Mr. Quinney~ The argument made under Point I is applicable. to. this ·phase of the error contained in this
Instruction.
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In addition, this Instruction 1s a comm·ent on the
evidence tending to indicate to the jury the attitude of
the Court on the question of knowledge of the accident.
Phrases like "the mere fact that", "mere employee" and
"mere batch plant op·erator'' necessarily imply that the
Court believes Mr. Taggart to have been without sufficient authority to bind Johnson Ready-Mix with his
knowledge.
This Court in Fox v. Taylor, (Utah, 1960) 350 P.
2d 154, said:
"We recognize the duty of the Court under
our law to avoid comments on the evidence; or
which may tend to indicate an opinion as to what
the facts are on disputed issues."
See also Rule 51, U.R.. C.P., which exp~ressly forbids
the trial court to "comment on the evidence in the case.''
CONCLUSION
Under the Instructions in this case, the jury could
h~ve found its verdict upon an issue which should not
have been submitted to it. The jury was aided in such
a finding by the comments of the trial judge contained

in the charge.
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-Delayed .notice of more than three years after the
accident is so flagrant a violation of the policy it suggest that the jury decided that Johnson Ready-Mix
did not know of the accident.
"The importance to an indemnitor of a
prompt and accurate report of an accident and
of full assistance and cooperation on the part
of the insured should not be minimized, and when
the insured £ails in this duty the release of the
indemnitor from liability is fully justified." Ohio
Farmers Indemnity Company v. Charleston
Laundry Co., (4 Cir~, 1950) 183 F. 2d 682.
The Judgment on Verdict in this case should be
reversed and a new trial granted if United Pacific is to
be afforded even minimum requirements of substantial
·justice.

'.

.

Respectfully submitted,

SKEEN, WORSLEY, SNOW &
CHRISTENSEN

Attorneys for Defendant
and Appellant
701 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lal\:e ·City 1, Utah
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